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Europe, Hungary and Yugoslavia as well) enjoyed an increase in per capita real consumption over 
the period 1973 through 1983 (World Development Report 1986)? And lest one object that GNP per 
capita only measures material welfare, infant mortality fell and life expectancy at birth increased in 
every European country over the six years from 1978 through 1984. Doubtless rates of economic 
progress are lower and levels of unemployment higher in the 1980s in Europe than was the case two 
decades earlier, but does this constitute a ''continuing crisis''? 
1he authors and their research assistants have laboured mightily and ranged widely to produce 
these volumes, which contain many positive features. But in the reviewer's opinion, they have failed 
overall to inform sufficiently and challenge adequately the potential university-level student of history 
or economics. It is regrettable that these volumes were not limited to a shorter period, fewer countries 
and a smaller range of materials. This tighter focus would have permitted increased accuracy and 
relevance, as well as more detail to buttress often insightful generalizations. 
* * * 
Paul B. Huber 
Dalhousie University 
Bernard Waites -A Class Society at War: England 1914-18. Leamington Spa: Berg Publishers, 
1987. Pp. 303. 
Bernard Waites argues that in the decade from 1914 a conjunction of societal changes altered 
the form of the class structure but maintained the processes of social differentiation. The changes 
were the elimination of much primary poverty and the concomitant decline in the living standards 
of the skilled artisans, a redistribution of the national income in favour of the salariat and workers, a 
narrowing of wage differentials between and within the working class and middle class, a reduction of 
the large incomes derived from wealth and some redistribution of that wealth, an expansion of 
educational opportunities, and a strengthening of civic integration. Waites does not fall into the trap 
of assuming that the war caused these changes- the war, he says, concentrated them in a brief 
span of time and gave a demonstrable impetus to long-term cultural and demographic trends. 
Using a culture-based model of class, Waites suggests that economically and culturally the 
working class in 1924 was more homogenous and more nationalistic than it had been in 1914. The 
pressures of economic mobilisation accentuated class divisions. lnftation, unequal income distribution 
and official restraints on labour created, we are told, a pent-up discontent which erupted in widespread 
industrial conflict in the aftermath of the war. Waites does not ignore but does pass over rather casually 
the fact that industrial conflict had been rife before 1914 and was scarcely muted during the war. 
It is a pity that he adheres so strictly to his self-imposed geographical limitations that he does not 
mention Clydeside. Where wartime distributions were notable and received much contemporary and, 
recently, some scholarly attention. Paradoxically, despite the political domination of the nationalist 
right, conscription and the direction of labour made for a more inclusive sense of national identity. 
A popular (he calls it demotic) nationalism was one legacy of the war. Although the war sensitised 
workers to class inequality (were they not already well sensitised?), Waites argues, nationalist 
sentiments in popular culture set limits on the political consequences of class feeling. 
The war was "a great divide in the history of everyday working-class life" (122) which 
separated the poverty of Charles Booth's London from the relative well-being of the 1920s. And, 
Waites tells us, there was another divide apparent by 1923. London was in the favoured south. An 
imaginary line crossed England from the south of the Severn to Scarborough, dividing the economic 
stagnation of the north from the south's war-stimulated manufacturing centres. It is depressingly 
familiar today but, surely, was current long before the twentieth century. Despite the increased 
geographical mobility afforded by the railways, a north-south polarisation was as recognizable to 
nineteenth century politicians and writers as was Disraeli's two nations of the rich and the poor. 
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Unfortunately, Waites does not compare class structures on either side of the line and the distribution 
statistics which he uses to support his argument of significant income redistribution do not take 
geographical factors into account. An equally important limitation on his analysis is his adoption 
of the old sociological orthodoxy that a woman's position was determined by the male head of the 
household. Waites sets "aside any special consideration of women in the class structure and the war's 
impact on their condition and experiences" ( 6), even though the book' dust -cover shows a woman 
munitions worker. 
There are few scholarly studies of the complex relationship between class and nation, the 
ambiguities and accommodations of which point to power relationships and social tensions. Waites' 
analysis is a welcome first attempt to deal with those issues during the Great War. The author perhaps 
sees the changes as greater than his evidence always suggests and there are some contradictions in 
the book. But, Waites recognises that he cannot come up with a definitive statement on class and 
industrialised warfare. This is a thoughtful and provocative work which raises more questions than 
it answers. 
* * * 
Gerald Jordan 
York University 
W.L. Warren- The Governance of Norman and Angevin England 1086-1272 . Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1987. Pp. xv, 237 . 
The first criterion for review of any monograph ought to be whether or not the study is a sig-
nificant addition to the already existing literature. By that standard this volume is redundant. Chapters 
one and two recapitulate data to be found in any standard text of medieval England; indeed, Chapter 
two repeats in small the already published first volume of the series- The Governance of England 
-of which Warren's is the second volume. Chapter three, four and five are adapted from Warren's 
masterful Henry II (1973). The other chapters, numbers six and seven, cover the period 1189-1272, 
about which there are surely writings in abundance- even, perhaps, already too many . 
The subliminal claims about The Governance in England Series, i.e., that there have been 
no comparable studies for the last two generations and that this series synthesizes recent research 
on English medieval government, not only defy logic but are palpable untrue. What is true is that 
although Warren lists all the studies which have been published in the twentieth century, he makes 
little or no use of them in his treatment of Anglo-Norman governance. 1s it enough to cite an author, 
R.H.C. Davies, for instance, in King Stephen (1967), and not acknowledge that the argument one 
is making about the reign of Stephen is substantially that of the cited authority? Warren implies that 
his argument- that Stephen, as king, was deliberately planning a decentralized government- is 
his own; it is, in fact essentially Davis' argument. 
There is another instance of this practice in Warren's study. He had early access to Marjorie 
Chibnall, Anglo-Norman England 1066-1166 (1986). Chibnall argues, with considerable elegance, 
for the "gradual assimilation of Norman and English institutions over several decades" (2). Warren, 
citing her study because it reviews recent work (24, Bibliographical Note) , ignores all that she has 
written on the subject of the relationship of Norman and English institutions in order to argue that 
the Normans did not adapt Anglo-Saxon government. Given the absolute paucity of evidence-
which Warren admits often- he ignores Chibnall at some peril. 
One justification for yet another study on governance might be that the author had such felicity 
of language that he or she provides a new clarity or undestanding of abstruse arguments. In this 
instance no such justification exists. One example oftortuous language must suffice: "There were, 
of course, some laws defined by the crown of generally universal application embodied in 'law codes,' 
